Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback.
Cooperation
Ecological feedback
Evolutionary game theory
Social dilemmas
Journal
Journal of theoretical biology
ISSN: 1095-8541
Titre abrégé: J Theor Biol
Pays: England
ID NLM: 0376342
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
07 02 2019
07 02 2019
Historique:
received:
04
07
2018
revised:
18
11
2018
accepted:
20
11
2018
pubmed:
25
11
2018
medline:
24
3
2020
entrez:
25
11
2018
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only determined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depend on an individual's location. Interestingly, in non-varying heterogeneous environments, the long-term dynamics are the same as for symmetric interactions in an average, homogeneous environment. However, introducing environmental feedback between an individual's strategy and the quality of its patch results in rich eco-evolutionary dynamics. Thus, individuals act as ecosystem engineers. The nature of the feedback and the rate of ecological changes can relax or aggravate social dilemmas and promote persistent periodic oscillations of strategy abundance and environmental quality.
Identifiants
pubmed: 30471298
pii: S0022-5193(18)30572-1
doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.11.019
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
347-360Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.