Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.
Apriorism
Cognitive success
Consequentialism
Is−ought relation
Logic
Rationality
Journal
Topics in cognitive science
ISSN: 1756-8765
Titre abrégé: Top Cogn Sci
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101506764
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
01 2019
01 2019
Historique:
received:
30
10
2018
revised:
19
11
2018
accepted:
30
11
2018
pubmed:
22
1
2019
medline:
29
3
2019
entrez:
22
1
2019
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
One of the most discussed issues in psychology-presently and in the past-is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoning-deductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choice-perform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive ("is") and the normative ("ought") in psychology and philosophy.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Review
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
7-36Informations de copyright
© 2019 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.