Analysis of Drivers of Disenrollment and Plan Switching Among Medicare Advantage Beneficiaries.
Aged
Cost Sharing
/ statistics & numerical data
Cross-Sectional Studies
Decision Making
Eligibility Determination
/ methods
Female
Health Expenditures
/ statistics & numerical data
Humans
Male
Medicare Part C
/ statistics & numerical data
Quality Indicators, Health Care
Retrospective Studies
United States
Journal
JAMA internal medicine
ISSN: 2168-6114
Titre abrégé: JAMA Intern Med
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101589534
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
01 04 2019
01 04 2019
Historique:
pubmed:
26
2
2019
medline:
14
2
2020
entrez:
26
2
2019
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
How often enrollees with complex care needs leave the Medicare Advantage (MA) program and what might drive their decisions remain unknown. To characterize trends in switching to and from MA among high-need beneficiaries and to evaluate the drivers of disenrollment decisions. This cross-sectional study of MA and traditional Medicare (TM) enrollees from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2015, used a multinomial logit regression stratified by Medicare-Medicaid eligibility status. All 14 589 645 non-high-need MA enrollees and 1 302 470 high-need enrollees in the United States who survived until the end of 2014 were eligible for the analysis. Data were analyzed from November 1, 2017, through August 1, 2018. Enrollee dual eligibility and high-need status (based on complex chronic conditions, multiple morbidities, use of health care services, functional impairment, and frailty indicators), MA plan star rating, and cost sharing. The proportion of enrollees who disenrolled into TM, remained in the same MA plan, or who switched plans within the MA program. A total of 13 901 816 enrollees were included in the analysis (56.2% women; mean [SD] age, 70.9 [9.9] years). Among the 1 302 470 high-need enrollees, an adjusted 4.6% (95% CI, 4.5%-4.6%) of Medicare-only and 14.8% (95% CI, 14.5%-15.0%) of Medicare-Medicaid members switched from MA to TM compared with 3.3% (95% CI, 3.3%-3.3%) and 4.6% (95% CI, 4.5%-4.7%), respectively, among non-high-need enrollees. Among enrollees in low-quality plans, 23.0% (95% CI, 22.3%-23.9%) of Medicare and 42.8% (95% CI, 40.5%-45.1%) of dual-eligible high-need enrollees left MA. Even in high-quality plans, high-need members disenrolled at higher rates than non-high-need members (4.9% [95% CI, 4.6%-5.2%] vs 1.8% [95% CI, 1.8%-1.9%] for Medicare-only enrollees and 11.3% vs 2.4% dual eligible enrollees). Enrollment in a 5.0-star rated plan was associated with a 30.1-percentage point reduction (95% CI, -31.7 to -28.4 percentage points) in the probability of disenrollment among high-need individuals. A $100 increase in monthly premiums was associated with a 33.9-percentage point increase (95% CI, -34.9 to -33.0 percentage points) in the likelihood of switching plans, and a small reduction in the likelihood of disenrolling (-2.7 percentage points; 95% CI, -3.2 to -2.2 percentage points). Among Medicare-Medicaid eligible participants, 14.1% (95% CI, 14.0%-14.2%) of high-need and 16.7% (95% CI, 16.6%-16.7%) of non-high-need enrollees switched from TM to MA. Results of this study suggest that substantially higher disenrollment from MA plans occurs among high-need and Medicare-Medicaid eligible enrollees. This study's findings suggest that star ratings have the strongest association with disenrollment trends, whereas increases in monthly premiums are associated with greater likelihood of switching plans.
Identifiants
pubmed: 30801625
pii: 2725083
doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.7639
pmc: PMC6450306
mid: NIHMS1016857
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Multicenter Study
Research Support, N.I.H., Extramural
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
524-532Subventions
Organisme : NIA NIH HHS
ID : T32 AG023482
Pays : United States
Organisme : NIA NIH HHS
ID : R01 AG047180
Pays : United States
Organisme : NIA NIH HHS
ID : P01 AG027296
Pays : United States
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