Asymmetric morality: Blame is more differentiated and more extreme than praise.
Journal
PloS one
ISSN: 1932-6203
Titre abrégé: PLoS One
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101285081
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2019
2019
Historique:
received:
30
10
2018
accepted:
22
02
2019
entrez:
13
3
2019
pubmed:
13
3
2019
medline:
4
12
2019
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Despite extensive recent investigations of moral judgments, little is known about how negative judgments like blame might differ from positive judgments like praise. Drawing on theory from both social and moral cognition, the present studies identify and test potential asymmetries in the extremity and differentiatedness of blame as compared to praise. The amplified blame hypothesis predicts that people will assign greater blame for negative behaviors than praise for positive behaviors. The differentiated blame hypothesis predicts that, as compared to praise judgments, blame judgments will more finely differentiate among distinct mental states that precede action, such as thoughts, desires, and intentions. A series of studies-using varied stimulus sets and samples-together provide robust support for the differentiated blame hypothesis and somewhat weaker support for the amplified blame hypotheses. These results illustrate systematic asymmetries between blame and praise, generally revealing that blame is more extreme and differentiated than praise. Together, the findings reflect the social costs and social regulatory function of moral judgments, suggesting that blame and praise are not mirror images and that blame might be more complex.
Identifiants
pubmed: 30861034
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0213544
pii: PONE-D-18-31344
pmc: PMC6413939
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e0213544Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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