The notion of free will and its ethical relevance for decision-making capacity.
Authenticity
Autonomy
Compatibilism
Competence
Decision-making capacity
Ethics
Free will
Harry Frankfurt
Informed consent
Journal
BMC medical ethics
ISSN: 1472-6939
Titre abrégé: BMC Med Ethics
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101088680
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
08 05 2019
08 05 2019
Historique:
received:
07
07
2018
accepted:
26
04
2019
entrez:
10
5
2019
pubmed:
10
5
2019
medline:
6
2
2020
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Obtaining informed consent from patients is a moral and legal duty and, thus, a key legitimation for medical treatment. The pivotal prerequisite for valid informed consent is decision-making capacity of the patient. Related to the question of whether and when consent should be morally and legally valid, there has been a long-lasting philosophical debate about freedom of will and the connection of freedom and responsibility. The scholarly discussion on decision-making capacity and its clinical evaluation does not sufficiently take into account this fundamental debate. It is contended that the notion of free will must be reflected when evaluating decision-making capacity. Namely, it should be included as a part of the appreciation-criterion for decision-making capacity. The argumentation is mainly drawn on the compatibilism of Harry Frankfurt. A solution is proposed which at the same time takes the notion of free will seriously and enriches the traditional understanding of decision-making capacity, strengthening its justificatory force while remaining clinically applicable.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
Obtaining informed consent from patients is a moral and legal duty and, thus, a key legitimation for medical treatment. The pivotal prerequisite for valid informed consent is decision-making capacity of the patient. Related to the question of whether and when consent should be morally and legally valid, there has been a long-lasting philosophical debate about freedom of will and the connection of freedom and responsibility.
MAIN TEXT
The scholarly discussion on decision-making capacity and its clinical evaluation does not sufficiently take into account this fundamental debate. It is contended that the notion of free will must be reflected when evaluating decision-making capacity. Namely, it should be included as a part of the appreciation-criterion for decision-making capacity. The argumentation is mainly drawn on the compatibilism of Harry Frankfurt.
CONCLUSIONS
A solution is proposed which at the same time takes the notion of free will seriously and enriches the traditional understanding of decision-making capacity, strengthening its justificatory force while remaining clinically applicable.
Identifiants
pubmed: 31068168
doi: 10.1186/s12910-019-0371-0
pii: 10.1186/s12910-019-0371-0
pmc: PMC6505276
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
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