Exploring the General Equilibrium Costs of Sector-Specific Environmental Regulations.
D58
Q52
Q58
environmental regulation
general equilibrium
social costs
Journal
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
ISSN: 2333-5963
Titre abrégé: J Assoc Environ Resour Econ
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101743533
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2019
2019
Historique:
entrez:
20
9
2019
pubmed:
20
9
2019
medline:
20
9
2019
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
The requisite scope of analysis to adequately estimate the social cost of environmental regulations has been subject to much discussion. The literature has demonstrated that engineering or partial equilibrium cost estimates likely underestimate the social cost of large-scale environmental regulations and environmental taxes. However, the conditions under which general equilibrium (GE) analysis adds value to welfare analysis for single-sector technology or performance standards, the predominant policy intervention in practice, remains an open question. Using a numerical computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we investigate the GE effects of regulations across different sectors, abatement technologies, and regulatory designs. Our results show that even for small regulations GE effects are significant, and engineering estimates of compliance costs can substantially underestimate the social cost of single-sector environmental regulations. We find the downward bias from using engineering costs to approximate social costs depends on the input composition of abatement technologies and the regulated sector.
Identifiants
pubmed: 31534986
doi: 10.1086/705593?mobileUi=0
pmc: PMC6750771
mid: NIHMS1032634
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Subventions
Organisme : Intramural EPA
ID : EPA999999
Pays : United States
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.