A moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption.
Peter Singer
comparable moral significance
embryo adoption
frozen human embryo
moral standing
Journal
Bioethics
ISSN: 1467-8519
Titre abrégé: Bioethics
Pays: England
ID NLM: 8704792
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
03 2020
03 2020
Historique:
received:
19
04
2019
revised:
13
08
2019
accepted:
17
08
2019
pubmed:
27
11
2019
medline:
2
10
2020
entrez:
27
11
2019
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three-premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the "some" are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
242-251Informations de copyright
© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.