Against the De Minimis Principle.

De minimis rational decision making risk

Journal

Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis
ISSN: 1539-6924
Titre abrégé: Risk Anal
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 8109978

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
05 2020
Historique:
received: 21 08 2019
revised: 22 12 2019
accepted: 27 12 2019
pubmed: 21 1 2020
medline: 21 1 2020
entrez: 21 1 2020
Statut: ppublish

Résumé

According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if the risk is sufficiently small. In this article, we argue that a de minimis threshold has no place in a normative theory of decision making, because the application of the principle will either recommend ignoring risks that should not be ignored (e.g., the sure death of a person) or it cannot be used by ordinary bounded and information-constrained agents.

Identifiants

pubmed: 31958149
doi: 10.1111/risa.13445
pmc: PMC7317961
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

908-914

Subventions

Organisme : Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
Pays : International

Informations de copyright

© 2020 The Authors. Risk Analysis published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society for Risk Analysis.

Références

Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2004 Winter;13(1):15-9
pubmed: 15045910
Risk Anal. 2019 Jun;39(6):1204-1222
pubmed: 30791108
Risk Anal. 1986 Dec;6(4):437-46
pubmed: 3110874

Auteurs

Björn Lundgren (B)

Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.

H Orri Stefánsson (HO)

Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden.
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, Sweden.

Classifications MeSH