Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management.

Social organizations, especially human society, rely on egalitarian social norm, which can be characterized by high levels of fairness, empathy and collective conformity. Nevertheless, the evolution of egalitarian social norm remains a conundrum, as it suffers the persistent challenge from individual self-interest. To address this issue, we construct an evolutionary game theoretical model by employing the Ultimatum Game, in which rational individuals are able to perform resource management. We show that resource management drives a population evolving into an oscillatory state with high equilibrium degrees of fairness, empathy and collective conformity and thus constitutes a key mechanism for the evolution of egalitarian social norm in social dilemma situations. Specifically, it results in (1) the formation of egalitarian social norm from diverse individual norms, (2) the emergence of egalitarian social norm in a selfish and unfair world, and (3) the maintenance of egalitarian social norm despite the presence of norm violators. The constructive role of resource management is explained by a mean-field analysis revealing that resource management can effectively enlarge the attraction basin of egalitarian norms or even change the dynamical property of the mini Ultimatum Game from bistability between egalitarian norms and less egalitarian norms to complete-dominance of egalitarian norms over less egalitarian norms. Furthermore, we find that the capacity of resource management can be evolutionarily selected by a coevolution between egalitarian social norm and resource management. Our study suggests that efficiency and equity are linked to each other.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.