Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts.
Journal
The Lancet. Global health
ISSN: 2214-109X
Titre abrégé: Lancet Glob Health
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101613665
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
04 2020
04 2020
Historique:
received:
19
02
2020
revised:
19
02
2020
accepted:
20
02
2020
pubmed:
3
3
2020
medline:
27
3
2020
entrez:
3
3
2020
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19. We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts. Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19.
METHODS
We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R
FINDINGS
Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R
INTERPRETATION
In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess the potential success of local response efforts.
FUNDING
Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.
Identifiants
pubmed: 32119825
pii: S2214-109X(20)30074-7
doi: 10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30074-7
pmc: PMC7097845
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e488-e496Subventions
Organisme : Wellcome Trust
ID : 210758/Z/18/Z
Pays : United Kingdom
Organisme : Wellcome Trust
ID : 206250/Z/17/Z
Pays : United Kingdom
Organisme : Wellcome Trust
Pays : United Kingdom
Organisme : Medical Research Council
ID : MR/S003975/1
Pays : United Kingdom
Organisme : Wellcome Trust
ID : 208812/Z/17/Z
Pays : United Kingdom
Investigateurs
Fiona Sun
(F)
Stefan Flasche
(S)
Billy J Quilty
(BJ)
Nicholas Davies
(N)
Yang Liu
(Y)
Samuel Clifford
(S)
Petra Klepac
(P)
Mark Jit
(M)
Charlie Diamond
(C)
Hamish Gibbs
(H)
Kevin van Zandvoort
(K)
Commentaires et corrections
Type : ErratumIn
Type : CommentIn
Type : CommentIn
Type : CommentIn
Type : CommentIn
Type : CommentIn
Type : CommentIn
Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.
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