A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination.
Age-structured model
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Polio
Vaccination
Journal
Journal of theoretical biology
ISSN: 1095-8541
Titre abrégé: J Theor Biol
Pays: England
ID NLM: 0376342
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
21 08 2020
21 08 2020
Historique:
received:
31
12
2019
revised:
21
04
2020
accepted:
26
04
2020
pubmed:
7
5
2020
medline:
22
6
2021
entrez:
7
5
2020
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Poliomyelitis is a worldwide disease that has nearly been eradicated thanks to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Nevertheless, the disease is currently still endemic in three countries. In this paper, we incorporate the vaccination in a two age-class model of polio dynamics. Our main objective is to see whether mandatory vaccination policy is needed or if polio could be almost eradicated by a voluntary vaccination. We perform game theoretical analysis and compare the herd immunity vaccination levels with the Nash equilibrium vaccination levels. We show that the gap between two vaccination levels is too large. We conclude that the mandatory vaccination policy is therefore needed to achieve a complete eradication.
Identifiants
pubmed: 32371008
pii: S0022-5193(20)30153-3
doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110298
pii:
doi:
Substances chimiques
Poliovirus Vaccine, Oral
0
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
110298Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.