Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation.

attributions of responsibility causal contingency and stability causality and responsibility epistemic perspective robust causation

Journal

Frontiers in psychology
ISSN: 1664-1078
Titre abrégé: Front Psychol
Pays: Switzerland
ID NLM: 101550902

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
2020
Historique:
received: 20 08 2019
accepted: 27 04 2020
entrez: 16 6 2020
pubmed: 17 6 2020
medline: 17 6 2020
Statut: epublish

Résumé

How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor - the robustness (or stability) of the causal chain linking the agent's action and the outcome - influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustness. In the first experiment, the robustness manipulation also raises the probability of the effect given the action. Experiments 2 and 3 control for probability-raising, and show that robustness still affects judgments of causal responsibility. In particular, Experiment 3 introduces an Ellsberg type of scenario to manipulate robustness, while keeping the conditional probability and the skill deployed in the action fixed. Experiment 4, replicates the results of Experiment 3, while contrasting between judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility. The results show that in all cases, the perceived degree of responsibility (but not of causal strength) increases with the robustness of the action-outcome causal chain.

Identifiants

pubmed: 32536893
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069
pmc: PMC7269104
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Pagination

1069

Informations de copyright

Copyright © 2020 Grinfeld, Lagnado, Gerstenberg, Woodward and Usher.

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Auteurs

Guy Grinfeld (G)

School of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

David Lagnado (D)

Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Department, Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.

Tobias Gerstenberg (T)

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, United States.

James F Woodward (JF)

Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.

Marius Usher (M)

School of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Classifications MeSH