Parental obligation and compelled caesarean section: careful analogies and reliable reasoning about individual cases.

autonomy coercion future child disability obstetrics and gynaecology right to refuse treatment

Journal

Journal of medical ethics
ISSN: 1473-4257
Titre abrégé: J Med Ethics
Pays: England
ID NLM: 7513619

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
22 Jun 2020
Historique:
received: 14 01 2020
revised: 16 04 2020
accepted: 25 04 2020
entrez: 24 6 2020
pubmed: 24 6 2020
medline: 24 6 2020
Statut: aheadofprint

Résumé

Whether it is morally permissible to compel women to undergo a caesarean section is a topic of longstanding debate. Despite plenty of arguments against the moral permissibility of a forced caesarean section, the question keeps cropping up. This paper seeks to scrutinise a particular moral argument in favour of compulsion: the appeal to parental obligation. We present what we take to be a distillation of the basic form of this argument. We then argue that, in the absence of an exhaustive theory of parental obligation, the question of whether a labouring woman is morally obliged to undergo emergency surgery-and especially the further question of it is morally permissible for third parties to compel this-cannot be answered via ready-made theory. We propose that the most viable option for settling both questions is by analogy. We follow earlier writers in presenting an analogous case-that of fathers being compelled to undergo non-consensual invasive surgery to save their children-but expand the analogy by considering objections that appeal to the ownership of the fetus. We offer two lines of response: (1) the parthood view of pregnancy and (2) chimaera dad. We argue that it is clear in the analogous case that compulsion cannot be justified. We also offer this analogy as a useful tool for assessing whether mothers have a moral duty to undergo caesarean sections, both in general and in particular cases, even if such a duty is insufficient to warrant compulsion.

Identifiants

pubmed: 32571848
pii: medethics-2020-106072
doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106072
pii:
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Informations de copyright

© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

Competing interests: None declared.

Auteurs

Elselijn Kingma (E)

Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK e.m.kingma@soton.ac.uk.
Department of Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands.

Lindsey Porter (L)

Law School, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK.

Classifications MeSH