Who sells tobacco, who stops? A comparison across different tobacco retailing schemes.
end game
harm reduction
public policy
Journal
Tobacco control
ISSN: 1468-3318
Titre abrégé: Tob Control
Pays: England
ID NLM: 9209612
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
02 Jul 2020
02 Jul 2020
Historique:
received:
11
12
2019
revised:
30
04
2020
accepted:
01
05
2020
entrez:
4
7
2020
pubmed:
4
7
2020
medline:
4
7
2020
Statut:
aheadofprint
Résumé
Licensing of tobacco retailers has been proposed as a mechanism to encourage retailers to stop selling tobacco. However, previous studies of tobacco licensing and/or of retailers who have stopped selling have been restricted to one legislative environment. This study examines patterns of tobacco retailing across three legislative environments with three different licensing schemes (an annual fee-based licence, a zero-cost, one-off notification scheme and no notification/licensing scheme). A telephone survey was conducted of 2928 potential tobacco retailers who could personally choose whether or not to sell tobacco (rather than the decision being made at a head office). Unexpectedly, the annual licence fee to sell tobacco was not significantly associated with a lower rate of selling tobacco or a higher rate of stopping. After allowing for other factors, probability of selling, stopping selling and reported importance of tobacco sales varied across outlet types (p<0.001 for all three outcomes), and according to the remoteness of the retailer (p<0.001, p trend=0.041 and p A fee of $A286 was not associated with a lower rate of selling, or a higher rate of stopping. The effect of licensing on retailer numbers will presumably be greater for higher licence fees, but will also depend on the perceived importance of tobacco sales to the retailer. In turn, importance of tobacco sales appears to depend on market factors, including proximity to major urban centres and low-cost competitors. A higher licence fee is likely to have a larger effect on discouraging retailers from selling.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
Licensing of tobacco retailers has been proposed as a mechanism to encourage retailers to stop selling tobacco. However, previous studies of tobacco licensing and/or of retailers who have stopped selling have been restricted to one legislative environment. This study examines patterns of tobacco retailing across three legislative environments with three different licensing schemes (an annual fee-based licence, a zero-cost, one-off notification scheme and no notification/licensing scheme).
METHOD
METHODS
A telephone survey was conducted of 2928 potential tobacco retailers who could personally choose whether or not to sell tobacco (rather than the decision being made at a head office).
RESULTS
RESULTS
Unexpectedly, the annual licence fee to sell tobacco was not significantly associated with a lower rate of selling tobacco or a higher rate of stopping. After allowing for other factors, probability of selling, stopping selling and reported importance of tobacco sales varied across outlet types (p<0.001 for all three outcomes), and according to the remoteness of the retailer (p<0.001, p trend=0.041 and p
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSIONS
A fee of $A286 was not associated with a lower rate of selling, or a higher rate of stopping. The effect of licensing on retailer numbers will presumably be greater for higher licence fees, but will also depend on the perceived importance of tobacco sales to the retailer. In turn, importance of tobacco sales appears to depend on market factors, including proximity to major urban centres and low-cost competitors. A higher licence fee is likely to have a larger effect on discouraging retailers from selling.
Identifiants
pubmed: 32616626
pii: tobaccocontrol-2019-055561
doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055561
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Informations de copyright
© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
Competing interests: No, there are no competing interests.