Active testing of groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in Canada: costs and human resource needs.
Betacoronavirus
/ isolation & purification
COVID-19
COVID-19 Testing
Canada
Clinical Laboratory Techniques
/ economics
Coronavirus Infections
/ diagnosis
Humans
Mass Screening
/ economics
Pandemics
/ economics
Pneumonia, Viral
/ diagnosis
Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction
/ economics
Risk Assessment
/ economics
Risk Factors
SARS-CoV-2
Journal
CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association journal = journal de l'Association medicale canadienne
ISSN: 1488-2329
Titre abrégé: CMAJ
Pays: Canada
ID NLM: 9711805
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
05 10 2020
05 10 2020
Historique:
accepted:
24
08
2020
pubmed:
11
9
2020
medline:
21
10
2020
entrez:
10
9
2020
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is largely passive, which impedes epidemic control. We defined active testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 using reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in all Canadian provinces. We identified 5 groups who should be prioritized for active RT-PCR testing: contacts of people who are positive for SARS-CoV-2, and 4 at-risk populations - hospital employees, community health care workers and people in long-term care facilities, essential business employees, and schoolchildren and staff. We estimated costs, human resources and laboratory capacity required to test people in each group or to perform surveillance testing in random samples. During July 8-17, 2020, across all provinces in Canada, an average of 41 751 RT-PCR tests were performed daily; we estimated this required 5122 personnel and cost $2.4 million per day ($67.8 million per month). Systematic contact tracing and testing would increase personnel needs 1.2-fold and monthly costs to $78.9 million. Conducted over a month, testing all hospital employees would require 1823 additional personnel, costing $29.0 million; testing all community health care workers and persons in long-term care facilities would require 11 074 additional personnel and cost $124.8 million; and testing all essential employees would cost $321.7 million, requiring 25 965 added personnel. Testing the larger population within schools over 6 weeks would require 46 368 added personnel and cost $816.0 million. Interventions addressing inefficiencies, including saliva-based sampling and pooling samples, could reduce costs by 40% and personnel by 20%. Surveillance testing in population samples other than contacts would cost 5% of the cost of a universal approach to testing at-risk populations. Active testing of groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 appears feasible and would support the safe reopening of the economy and schools more broadly. This strategy also appears affordable compared with the $169.2 billion committed by the federal government as a response to the pandemic as of June 2020.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
Testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is largely passive, which impedes epidemic control. We defined active testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 using reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in all Canadian provinces.
METHODS
We identified 5 groups who should be prioritized for active RT-PCR testing: contacts of people who are positive for SARS-CoV-2, and 4 at-risk populations - hospital employees, community health care workers and people in long-term care facilities, essential business employees, and schoolchildren and staff. We estimated costs, human resources and laboratory capacity required to test people in each group or to perform surveillance testing in random samples.
RESULTS
During July 8-17, 2020, across all provinces in Canada, an average of 41 751 RT-PCR tests were performed daily; we estimated this required 5122 personnel and cost $2.4 million per day ($67.8 million per month). Systematic contact tracing and testing would increase personnel needs 1.2-fold and monthly costs to $78.9 million. Conducted over a month, testing all hospital employees would require 1823 additional personnel, costing $29.0 million; testing all community health care workers and persons in long-term care facilities would require 11 074 additional personnel and cost $124.8 million; and testing all essential employees would cost $321.7 million, requiring 25 965 added personnel. Testing the larger population within schools over 6 weeks would require 46 368 added personnel and cost $816.0 million. Interventions addressing inefficiencies, including saliva-based sampling and pooling samples, could reduce costs by 40% and personnel by 20%. Surveillance testing in population samples other than contacts would cost 5% of the cost of a universal approach to testing at-risk populations.
INTERPRETATION
Active testing of groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 appears feasible and would support the safe reopening of the economy and schools more broadly. This strategy also appears affordable compared with the $169.2 billion committed by the federal government as a response to the pandemic as of June 2020.
Identifiants
pubmed: 32907820
pii: cmaj.201128
doi: 10.1503/cmaj.201128
pmc: PMC7546745
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
E1146-E1155Commentaires et corrections
Type : CommentIn
Informations de copyright
© 2020 Joule Inc. or its licensors.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
Competing interests: Alton Russell has provided consulting services to Terumo BCT, a medical device company, unrelated to and outside the submitted work; Terumo BCT does not manufacture diagnostic tests. Stephanie Law is a part-time employee at Carebook Technologies Inc., a mobile app tech company; Carebook Technologies Inc. is currently pilot-testing an app for monitoring symptoms related to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19); this is unrelated to and outside the submitted work. Jonathon Campbell reports that he has received consulting fees from the COVID-19 Immunity Task Force, outside and unrelated to the submitted work. The fees were received and the work performed after initial submission of the present manuscript. Olivia Oxlade reports being Associate Scientific Director (Management) for the COVID-19 Immunity Task Force. All of the work related to this manuscript was done while Dr. Oxlade was part of the McGill International TB Centre and before this position started. Timothy Evans is Executive Director of the COVID-19 Immunity Task Force. No other competing interests were declared.
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