Defensive Resource Allocation: The Roles of Forecast Information and Risk Control.
Forecast information
homeland security
resource allocation
risk control
Journal
Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis
ISSN: 1539-6924
Titre abrégé: Risk Anal
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 8109978
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
08 2021
08 2021
Historique:
revised:
15
09
2020
received:
12
07
2019
accepted:
15
10
2020
pubmed:
12
11
2020
medline:
12
11
2020
entrez:
11
11
2020
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
In defensive resource allocation problems, the defender usually collects some forecast information about the attacker. However, the forecast information may be incorrect, which means that there could be a risk associated with the defender using it in their decision making. In this article, we propose a forecast and risk control (FRC) framework to manage the risk in defensive resource allocation with forecast information. In the FRC framework, we introduce a new measure of risk and three types of defense plans: riskless defense plan, risky defense plan, and risk-control defense plan. Several desirable properties based on the concepts of reward and penalty show that the risk-control defense plan is a general form to support defensive resource allocation. Subsequently, we study a specific defensive allocation problem with forecast information and develop an optimization model that considers the forecast information and the defender's risk tolerance level in order to obtain the risk-control defense plan with maximum reward. Furthermore, we provide some numerical analysis to illustrate the effects of forecast information and risk tolerance level on the risk-control defense plan. Finally, a numerical case study is presented to demonstrate the usability of a risk-control defense plan.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
1304-1322Informations de copyright
© 2020 Society for Risk Analysis.
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