Religion, parochialism and intuitive cooperation.
Journal
Nature human behaviour
ISSN: 2397-3374
Titre abrégé: Nat Hum Behav
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101697750
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
04 2021
04 2021
Historique:
received:
23
01
2019
accepted:
16
11
2020
pubmed:
6
1
2021
medline:
29
6
2021
entrez:
5
1
2021
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Religions promote cooperation, but they can also be divisive. Is religious cooperation intuitively parochial against atheists? Evidence supporting the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH) suggests that cooperation is intuitive, independent of religious group identity. We tested this prediction in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, where 1,280 practising Christian believers were paired with either a coreligionist or an atheist and where time limits were used to increase reliance on either intuitive or deliberated decisions. We explored another dual-process account of cooperation, the self-control account (SCA), which suggests that visceral reactions tend to be selfish and that cooperation requires deliberation. We found evidence for religious parochialism but no support for SHH's prediction of intuitive cooperation. Consistent with SCA but requiring confirmation in future studies, exploratory analyses showed that religious parochialism involves decision conflict and concern for strong reciprocity and that deliberation promotes cooperation independent of religious group identity. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 28 January 2020. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12086781.v1 .
Identifiants
pubmed: 33398149
doi: 10.1038/s41562-020-01014-3
pii: 10.1038/s41562-020-01014-3
doi:
Banques de données
figshare
['10.6084/m9.figshare.12086781.v1']
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
512-521Références
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