Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect.
Journal
Psychological research
ISSN: 1430-2772
Titre abrégé: Psychol Res
Pays: Germany
ID NLM: 0435062
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
Feb 2022
Feb 2022
Historique:
received:
18
05
2020
accepted:
07
12
2020
pubmed:
24
1
2021
medline:
10
2
2022
entrez:
23
1
2021
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
People are more likely to judge repeatedly perceived statements as true. A decisive explanation for this so-called truth effect is that the repeated information can be processed more fluently than new information and that this fluency experience renders the information more familiar and trustworthy. Little is known, however, regarding whether and how affective states and dispositional cognitive preferences influence the truth effect. To this end, we conducted two experiments in which we manipulated (a) processing fluency via repetition, (b) the time interval (10 min vs. 1 week) between repetitions, and (c) short-term affective states using the presentation of emotional faces (Experiment 1) or the presence of an irrelevant source for changes in affective states (Experiment 2). Additionally, we assessed the dispositional variables need for cognitive closure (NCC), preference for deliberation (PD) and preference for intuition (PI). Results of Experiment 1 showed that the truth effect was significantly reduced for statements that were followed by a negative prime, although this was the case only for the longer repetition lag. Furthermore, higher NCC and lower PD scores were associated with an increased truth effect. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the moderating role of NCC and further showed that participants, who were provided with an alternative source for changes in their affective states, showed a reduced truth effect. Together, the findings suggest that (a) fluency-related changes in affective states may be (co-)responsible for the truth effect, (b) the truth effect is decreased when the repetition interval is long rather than short, and (c) the truth effect is increased for individuals with a higher need for cognitive closure. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
Identifiants
pubmed: 33484352
doi: 10.1007/s00426-020-01459-1
pii: 10.1007/s00426-020-01459-1
pmc: PMC8821071
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
12-36Informations de copyright
© 2021. The Author(s).
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