A Similarity Heuristic in Children's Possibility Judgments.
Journal
Child development
ISSN: 1467-8624
Titre abrégé: Child Dev
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 0372725
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
03 2021
03 2021
Historique:
pubmed:
2
2
2021
medline:
20
7
2021
entrez:
1
2
2021
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Children often judge that strange and improbable events are impossible, but the mechanisms behind their reasoning remain unclear. This article (N = 250) provides evidence that young children use a similarity heuristic that compares potential events to similar known events to determine whether events are possible. Experiment 1 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds who hear about improbable events go on to judge that similar improbable events can happen. Experiment 2 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds more often affirm that improbable events can happen if told about related improbable events than if told about unrelated ones. Finally, Experiment 3 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds affirm the possibility of improbable events related to known events, but deny that related impossible events can happen.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
662-671Informations de copyright
© 2021 Society for Research in Child Development.
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