Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Infectivity by Viral Load, S Gene Variants and Demographic Factors, and the Utility of Lateral Flow Devices to Prevent Transmission.

B.1.1.7 variant SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing infectivity lateral flow device

Journal

Clinical infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America
ISSN: 1537-6591
Titre abrégé: Clin Infect Dis
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 9203213

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
11 02 2022
Historique:
received: 30 03 2021
pubmed: 12 5 2021
medline: 17 2 2022
entrez: 11 5 2021
Statut: ppublish

Résumé

How severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infectivity varies with viral load is incompletely understood. Whether rapid point-of-care antigen lateral flow devices (LFDs) detect most potential transmission sources despite imperfect clinical sensitivity is unknown. We combined SARS-CoV-2 testing and contact tracing data from England between 1 September 2020 and 28 February 2021. We used multivariable logistic regression to investigate relationships between polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-confirmed infection in contacts of community-diagnosed cases and index case viral load, S gene target failure (proxy for B.1.1.7 infection), demographics, SARS-CoV-2 incidence, social deprivation, and contact event type. We used LFD performance to simulate the proportion of cases with a PCR-positive contact expected to be detected using 1 of 4 LFDs. In total, 231 498/2 474 066 (9%) contacts of 1 064 004 index cases tested PCR-positive. PCR-positive results in contacts independently increased with higher case viral loads (lower cycle threshold [Ct] values), for example, 11.7% (95% confidence interval [CI] 11.5-12.0%) at Ct = 15 and 4.5% (95% CI 4.4-4.6%) at Ct = 30. B.1.1.7 infection increased PCR-positive results by ~50%, (eg, 1.55-fold, 95% CI 1.49-1.61, at Ct = 20). PCR-positive results were most common in household contacts (at Ct = 20.1, 8.7% [95% CI 8.6-8.9%]), followed by household visitors (7.1% [95% CI 6.8-7.3%]), contacts at events/activities (5.2% [95% CI 4.9-5.4%]), work/education (4.6% [95% CI 4.4-4.8%]), and least common after outdoor contact (2.9% [95% CI 2.3-3.8%]). Contacts of children were the least likely to test positive, particularly following contact outdoors or at work/education. The most and least sensitive LFDs would detect 89.5% (95% CI 89.4-89.6%) and 83.0% (95% CI 82.8-83.1%) of cases with PCR-positive contacts, respectively. SARS-CoV-2 infectivity varies by case viral load, contact event type, and age. Those with high viral loads are the most infectious. B.1.1.7 increased transmission by ~50%. The best performing LFDs detect most infectious cases.

Sections du résumé

BACKGROUND
How severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infectivity varies with viral load is incompletely understood. Whether rapid point-of-care antigen lateral flow devices (LFDs) detect most potential transmission sources despite imperfect clinical sensitivity is unknown.
METHODS
We combined SARS-CoV-2 testing and contact tracing data from England between 1 September 2020 and 28 February 2021. We used multivariable logistic regression to investigate relationships between polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-confirmed infection in contacts of community-diagnosed cases and index case viral load, S gene target failure (proxy for B.1.1.7 infection), demographics, SARS-CoV-2 incidence, social deprivation, and contact event type. We used LFD performance to simulate the proportion of cases with a PCR-positive contact expected to be detected using 1 of 4 LFDs.
RESULTS
In total, 231 498/2 474 066 (9%) contacts of 1 064 004 index cases tested PCR-positive. PCR-positive results in contacts independently increased with higher case viral loads (lower cycle threshold [Ct] values), for example, 11.7% (95% confidence interval [CI] 11.5-12.0%) at Ct = 15 and 4.5% (95% CI 4.4-4.6%) at Ct = 30. B.1.1.7 infection increased PCR-positive results by ~50%, (eg, 1.55-fold, 95% CI 1.49-1.61, at Ct = 20). PCR-positive results were most common in household contacts (at Ct = 20.1, 8.7% [95% CI 8.6-8.9%]), followed by household visitors (7.1% [95% CI 6.8-7.3%]), contacts at events/activities (5.2% [95% CI 4.9-5.4%]), work/education (4.6% [95% CI 4.4-4.8%]), and least common after outdoor contact (2.9% [95% CI 2.3-3.8%]). Contacts of children were the least likely to test positive, particularly following contact outdoors or at work/education. The most and least sensitive LFDs would detect 89.5% (95% CI 89.4-89.6%) and 83.0% (95% CI 82.8-83.1%) of cases with PCR-positive contacts, respectively.
CONCLUSIONS
SARS-CoV-2 infectivity varies by case viral load, contact event type, and age. Those with high viral loads are the most infectious. B.1.1.7 increased transmission by ~50%. The best performing LFDs detect most infectious cases.

Identifiants

pubmed: 33972994
pii: 6273394
doi: 10.1093/cid/ciab421
pmc: PMC8136027
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

407-415

Subventions

Organisme : Medical Research Council
ID : MR/W02067X/1
Pays : United Kingdom

Informations de copyright

© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press for the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

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Auteurs

Lennard Y W Lee (LYW)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

Stefan Rozmanowski (S)

Department of Health and Social Care, UK Government, London, United Kingdom.

Matthew Pang (M)

Department of Health and Social Care, UK Government, London, United Kingdom.

Andre Charlett (A)

Public Health England, London,United Kingdom.

Charlotte Anderson (C)

Public Health England, London,United Kingdom.

Gareth J Hughes (GJ)

Public Health England, London,United Kingdom.

Matthew Barnard (M)

Department of Health and Social Care, UK Government, London, United Kingdom.

Leon Peto (L)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

Richard Vipond (R)

Public Health England, Porton Down,United Kingdom.

Alex Sienkiewicz (A)

Public Health England, Porton Down,United Kingdom.

Susan Hopkins (S)

Public Health England, London,United Kingdom.

John Bell (J)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

Derrick W Crook (DW)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford,United Kingdom.
NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in in Healthcare Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.

Nick Gent (N)

Public Health England, London,United Kingdom.

A Sarah Walker (AS)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford,United Kingdom.
NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in in Healthcare Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.

Tim E A Peto (TEA)

Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford,United Kingdom.
NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in in Healthcare Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.

David W Eyre (DW)

NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford,United Kingdom.
NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in in Healthcare Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Big Data Institute, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.

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