Hempel on scientific understanding.
Journal
Studies in history and philosophy of science
ISSN: 0039-3681
Titre abrégé: Stud Hist Philos Sci
Pays: England
ID NLM: 1250602
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
08 2021
08 2021
Historique:
received:
11
07
2020
revised:
02
05
2021
accepted:
26
05
2021
pubmed:
2
7
2021
medline:
5
4
2022
entrez:
1
7
2021
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one that provides understanding. Apparently, H1, H2, and H3 cannot be all true. Some philosophers think that Hempel is inconsistent, while some others claim that Hempel does not actually hold H3. I argue that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold all of H1, H2, and H3 if he endorses what I call the "understanding argument." I also show how attributing the understanding argument to Hempel can make more sense of his D-N model and his philosophical analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation.
Identifiants
pubmed: 34198023
pii: S0039-3681(21)00073-X
doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.05.009
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
164-171Informations de copyright
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