Studies in Ecological Rationality.
Adaptive rationality
Decision-making
Ecological rationality
Environmental structures
Heuristics
Risk-reward structures
Strategic games
Journal
Topics in cognitive science
ISSN: 1756-8765
Titre abrégé: Top Cogn Sci
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101506764
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
07 2022
07 2022
Historique:
revised:
07
05
2021
received:
12
11
2020
accepted:
15
07
2021
pubmed:
27
7
2021
medline:
22
7
2022
entrez:
26
7
2021
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Ecological rationality represents an alternative to classic frameworks of rationality. Extending on Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality, it holds that cognitive processes, including simple heuristics, are not per se rational or irrational, but that their success rests on their degree of fit to relevant environmental structures. The key is therefore to understand how cognitive and environmental structures slot together. In recent years, a growing set of analyses of heuristic-environment systems has deepened the understanding of the human mind and how boundedly rational heuristics can result in successful decision making. This article is concerned with three conceptual challenges in the study of ecological rationality. First, do heuristics also succeed in dynamic contexts involving competitive agents? Second, can the mind adapt to environmental structures via an unsupervised learning process? Third, how can research go beyond mere descriptions of environmental structures to develop theories of the mechanisms that give rise to those structures? In addressing these questions, we illustrate that a successful theory of rationality will focus on the adaptive aspects of the mind and will need to account for three components: the mind's information processing, the environment to which the mind adapts, and the intersection between the environment and the mind.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
467-491Informations de copyright
© 2021 The Authors. Topics in Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society.
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