Timing of social feedback shapes observational learning in strategic interaction.
Journal
Scientific reports
ISSN: 2045-2322
Titre abrégé: Sci Rep
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101563288
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
09 11 2021
09 11 2021
Historique:
received:
26
06
2021
accepted:
26
10
2021
entrez:
10
11
2021
pubmed:
11
11
2021
medline:
1
2
2022
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Many types of social interaction require the ability to anticipate others' behavior, which is commonly referred to as strategic sophistication. In this context, observational learning can represent a decisive tool for behavioral adaptation. However, little is known on whether and when individuals learn from observation in interactive settings. In the current study, 321 participants played one-shot interactive games and, at a given time along the experiment, they could observe the choices of an overtly efficient player. This social feedback could be provided before or after the participant's choice in each game. Results reveal that players with a sufficient level of strategic skills increased their level of sophistication only when the social feedback was provided after their choices, whereas they relied on blind imitation when they received feedback before their decision. Conversely, less sophisticated players did not increase their level of sophistication, regardless of the type of social feedback. Our findings disclose the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors modulating observational learning in strategic interaction.
Identifiants
pubmed: 34754038
doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-01466-1
pii: 10.1038/s41598-021-01466-1
pmc: PMC8578421
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
21972Subventions
Organisme : FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
ID : ERC Consolidator Grant 617629
Organisme : FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
ID : ERC Consolidator Grant 617629
Organisme : FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
ID : ERC Consolidator Grant 617629
Organisme : FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
ID : ERC Consolidator Grant 617629
Informations de copyright
© 2021. The Author(s).
Références
Camerer, C. F. Behavioral Game Theory (Princeton University Press, 2003).
Marchiori, D., Di Guida, S. & Polonio, L. Plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision-making. J. Econ. Theory 196, 105291 (2021).
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105291
Knoepfle, D. T., Wang, J. T. Y. & Camerer, C. F. Studying learning in games using eye-tracking. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 7, 388–398 (2009).
doi: 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.388
Nagel, R. Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 85, 1313–1326 (1995).
Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Hum. Relat. 7, 117–140 (1954).
doi: 10.1177/001872675400700202
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J. & Henrich, J. The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for human adaptation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 10918–10925 (2011).
pubmed: 21690340
pmcid: 3131818
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1100290108
Kameda, T. & Nakanishi, D. Cost–benefit analysis of social/cultural learning in a nonstationary uncertain environment: An evolutionary simulation and an experiment with human subjects. Evol. Hum. Behav. 23, 373–393 (2002).
doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00101-0
Morgan, T. J., Rendell, L. E., Ehn, M., Hoppitt, W. & Laland, K. N. The evolutionary basis of human social learning. Proc. R. Soc. B 279, 653–662 (2012).
pubmed: 21795267
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.1172
Lindström, B., Selbing, I. & Olsson, A. Co-evolution of social learning and evolutionary preparedness in dangerous environments. PLoS ONE 11, e0160245 (2016).
pubmed: 27487079
pmcid: 4972391
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0160245
Burke, C. J., Tobler, P. N., Baddeley, M. & Schultz, W. Neural mechanisms of observational learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 14431–14436 (2010).
pubmed: 20660717
pmcid: 2922583
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1003111107
Laland, K. N. Social learning strategies. Anim. Learn. Behav. 32, 4–14 (2004).
doi: 10.3758/BF03196002
Kendal, R. L., Coolen, I. & Laland, K. N. The role of conformity in foraging when personal and social information conflict. Behav Ecol. 15, 269–277 (2004).
doi: 10.1093/beheco/arh008
Biele, G., Rieskamp, J. & Gonzalez, R. Computational models for the combination of advice and individual learning. Cogn. Sci. 33, 206–242 (2009).
pubmed: 21585468
doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01010.x
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Why does culture increase human adaptability?. Ethol. Sociobiol. 16, 125–143 (1995).
doi: 10.1016/0162-3095(94)00073-G
Kendal, J. R., Rendell, L., Pike, T. W. & Laland, K. N. Nine-spined sticklebacks deploy a hill-climbing social learning strategy. Behav. Ecol. 20, 238–244 (2009).
doi: 10.1093/beheco/arp016
Lindström, B. & Olsson, A. Mechanisms of social avoidance learning can explain the emergence of adaptive and arbitrary behavioral traditions in humans. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 144, 688–703 (2015).
pubmed: 25867224
doi: 10.1037/xge0000071
Liljeholm, M., Molloy, C. J. & O’Doherty, J. P. Dissociable brain systems mediate vicarious learning of stimulus—Response and action—Outcome contingencies. J. Neurosci. 32, 9878–9886 (2012).
pubmed: 22815503
pmcid: 3428877
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0548-12.2012
Rendell, L. et al. Why copy others? Insights from the social learning strategies tournament. Science 328, 208–213 (2010).
pubmed: 20378813
pmcid: 2989663
doi: 10.1126/science.1184719
Suzuki, S. et al. Learning to simulate others’ decisions. Neuron 74, 1125–1137 (2012).
pubmed: 22726841
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.030
Charpentier, C. J., Iigaya, K. & O’Doherty, J. P. A neuro-computational account of arbitration between choice imitation and goal emulation during human observational learning. Neuron 106, 687–699 (2020).
pubmed: 32187528
pmcid: 7244377
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2020.02.028
Kendal, R. L. et al. Social learning strategies: Bridge-building between fields. Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 651–665 (2018).
pubmed: 29759889
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.04.003
McElreath, R. et al. Applying evolutionary models to the laboratory study of social learning. Evol. Hum. Behav. 26, 483–508 (2005).
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.04.003
Rendell, L. et al. Cognitive culture: theoretical and empirical insights into social learning strategies. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 68–76 (2011).
pubmed: 21215677
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.12.002
Ihssen, N., Mussweiler, T. & Linden, D. E. Observing others stay or switch–How social prediction errors are integrated into reward reversal learning. Cognition 153, 19–32 (2016).
pubmed: 27128170
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.012
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T. H. & Chong, J. K. A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Q. J. Econ. 119, 861–898 (2004).
doi: 10.1162/0033553041502225
Chong, J. K., Ho, T. H. & Camerer, C. A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games. Games Econ. Behav. 99, 257–274 (2016).
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.007
Ho, T. H., Camerer, C. & Weigelt, K. Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental “p-beauty contests”. Am. Econ. Rev. 88, 947–969 (1998).
Nash, J. F. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36, 48–49 (1950).
pubmed: 16588946
pmcid: 1063129
doi: 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
Mailath, G. J. Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory. J. Econ. Lit. 36, 1347–1374 (1998).
Brañas-Garza, P., Garcia-Muñoz, T. & González, R. H. Cognitive effort in the beauty contest game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 83, 254–260 (2012).
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.018
Carpenter, J., Graham, M. & Wolf, J. Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication. Games Econ. Behav. 80, 115–130 (2013).
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.012
Gill, D. & Prowse, V. Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium: A level k analysis. J. Polit. Econ. 124, 1619–1676 (2016).
doi: 10.1086/688849
Proto, E., Rustichini, A. & Sofianos, A. Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. J. Polit. Econ. 127, 1351–1390 (2019).
doi: 10.1086/701355
Devetag, G. & Warglien, M. Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation. Games Econ. Behav. 62, 364–382 (2008).
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.007
Zonca, J., Coricelli, G. & Polonio, L. Gaze patterns disclose the link between cognitive reflection and sophistication in strategic interaction. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 15, 230–245 (2020).
doi: 10.1017/S1930297500007373
Costa-Gomes, M. A. & Weizsäcker, G. Stated beliefs and play in normal-form games. Rev. Econ. Stud. 75, 729–762 (2008).
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00498.x
Polonio, L. & Coricelli, G. Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking. Games Econ. Behav. 113, 566–586 (2019).
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.003
Coricelli, G. & Nagel, R. Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 9163–9168 (2009).
pubmed: 19470476
pmcid: 2685737
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0807721106
Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (Macmillan, 1936).
Devetag, G., Di Guida, S. & Polonio, L. An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games. Exp. Econ. 19, 177–201 (2016).
doi: 10.1007/s10683-015-9432-5
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J. P., Goette, L. & Rustichini, A. Cognitive skills affect economic preferences, strategic behavior, and job attachment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 7745–7750 (2009).
pubmed: 19416865
pmcid: 2683075
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812360106
Burnham, T. C., Cesarini, D., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P. & Wallace, B. Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 72, 171–175 (2009).
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.015
Fehr, D. & Huck, S. Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability. Exp. Econ. 19, 713–726 (2016).
doi: 10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0
Kiss, H. J., Rodriguez-Lara, I. & Rosa-García, A. Think twice before running! Bank runs and cognitive abilities. J. Behav. Exp. Econ. 64, 12–19 (2016).
doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.01.006
Georganas, S., Healy, P. J. & Weber, R. A. On the persistence of strategic sophistication. J. Econ. Theory 159, 369–400 (2015).
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012
Hanaki, N., Jacquemet, N., Luchini, S. & Zylbersztejn, A. Fluid intelligence and cognitive reflection in a strategic environment: evidence from dominance-solvable games. Front. Psychol. 7, 1188 (2016).
pubmed: 27559324
pmcid: 4978737
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01188
Mohammed, S. & Dumville, B. C. Team mental models in a team knowledge framework: Expanding theory and measurement across disciplinary boundaries. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 22, 89–106 (2001).
doi: 10.1002/job.86
Mesoudi, A. How cultural evolutionary theory can inform social psychology and vice versa. Psychol. Rev. 116, 929–952 (2009).
pubmed: 19839691
doi: 10.1037/a0017062
Verbrugge, R., Meijering, B., Wierda, S., Van Rijn, H. & Taatgen, N. Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 13, 79–98 (2018).
doi: 10.1017/S1930297500008846
Zonca, J., Coricelli, G. & Polonio, L. Does exposure to alternative decision rules change gaze patterns and behavioral strategies in games?. J. Econ. Sci. Assoc. 5, 14–25 (2019).
doi: 10.1007/s40881-019-00066-0
Vostroknutov, A., Polonio, L. & Coricelli, G. The role of intelligence in social learning. Sci. Rep. 8, 1–10 (2018).
doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-25289-9
Mesoudi, A. An experimental simulation of the copy-successful-individuals cultural learning strategy: adaptive landscapes, producer scrounger dynamics, and informational access costs. Evol. Hum. Behav. 29, 350–363 (2008).
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.04.005
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. An evolutionary model of social learning: the effects of spatial and temporal variation. In Social Learning: Psychological and Biological Perspectives (eds Zentall, T. R. & Galef, B. G.) 29–48 (Hillsdale, 1988).
Feldman, M. W., Aoki, K. & Kumm, J. Individual versus social learning: Evolutionary analysis in a fluctuating environment. Anthropol. Sci. 104, 209–232 (1996).
doi: 10.1537/ase.104.209
Vega-Redondo, F. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375–384 (1997).
doi: 10.2307/2171898
Apesteguia, J., Huck, S. & Oechssler, J. Imitation—Theory and experimental evidence. J. Econ. Theory 136, 217–235 (2007).
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.006
Bovens, L. & Hartmann, S. Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2003).
Galton, F. Vox populi. Nature 75, 450–451 (1907).
doi: 10.1038/075450a0
Nitzan, S. & Paroush, J. Optimal decision rules in uncertain dichotomous choice situations. Int. Econ. Rev. 23, 289–297 (1982).
doi: 10.2307/2526438
Surowiecki, J. The Wisdom of Crowds (Anchor, 2005).
Zonca, J., Folsø, A. & Sciutti, A. Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity. Sci. Rep. 11, 1–14 (2021).
doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-90656-y
Fraley, C. & Raftery, A. E. Model-based clustering, discriminant analysis and density estimation. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 97, 611–631 (2002).
doi: 10.1198/016214502760047131
Polonio, L., Di Guida, S. & Coricelli, G. Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study. Games Econ. Behav. 94, 80–96 (2015).
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.003
Eicker, F. Asymptotic normality and consistency of the least squares estimators for families of linear regressions. Ann. Math. Stat. 34, 447–456 (1963).
doi: 10.1214/aoms/1177704156
Huber, P. J. The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard conditions. In Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability (University of California Press, 1967).
White, H. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817–838 (1980).
doi: 10.2307/1912934