Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample.
Journal
Nature human behaviour
ISSN: 2397-3374
Titre abrégé: Nat Hum Behav
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101697750
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
06 2022
06 2022
Historique:
received:
15
04
2019
accepted:
14
02
2022
pubmed:
16
4
2022
medline:
28
6
2022
entrez:
15
4
2022
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.
Identifiants
pubmed: 35422529
doi: 10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5
pii: 10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
880-895Commentaires et corrections
Type : ErratumIn
Informations de copyright
© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.
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