Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography.


Journal

Nature
ISSN: 1476-4687
Titre abrégé: Nature
Pays: England
ID NLM: 0410462

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
05 2022
Historique:
received: 18 05 2021
accepted: 08 03 2022
entrez: 13 5 2022
pubmed: 14 5 2022
medline: 18 5 2022
Statut: ppublish

Résumé

Quantum computers are expected to break modern public key cryptography owing to Shor's algorithm. As a result, these cryptosystems need to be replaced by quantum-resistant algorithms, also known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The PQC research field has flourished over the past two decades, leading to the creation of a large variety of algorithms that are expected to be resistant to quantum attacks. These PQC algorithms are being selected and standardized by several standardization bodies. However, even with the guidance from these important efforts, the danger is not gone: there are billions of old and new devices that need to transition to the PQC suite of algorithms, leading to a multidecade transition process that has to account for aspects such as security, algorithm performance, ease of secure implementation, compliance and more. Here we present an organizational perspective of the PQC transition. We discuss transition timelines, leading strategies to protect systems against quantum attacks, and approaches for combining pre-quantum cryptography with PQC to minimize transition risks. We suggest standards to start experimenting with now and provide a series of other recommendations to allow organizations to achieve a smooth and timely PQC transition.

Identifiants

pubmed: 35546191
doi: 10.1038/s41586-022-04623-2
pii: 10.1038/s41586-022-04623-2
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article Review

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

237-243

Informations de copyright

© 2022. Springer Nature Limited.

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Auteurs

David Joseph (D)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA. david.joseph@sandboxaq.com.

Rafael Misoczki (R)

Google, Mountain View, CA, USA.

Marc Manzano (M)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Joe Tricot (J)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Fernando Dominguez Pinuaga (FD)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Olivier Lacombe (O)

Google, Mountain View, CA, USA.

Stefan Leichenauer (S)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Jack Hidary (J)

SandboxAQ, Palo Alto, CA, USA.

Phil Venables (P)

Google, Mountain View, CA, USA.

Royal Hansen (R)

Google, Mountain View, CA, USA.

Classifications MeSH