Differential impact of quarantine policies for recovered COVID-19 cases in England: a case cohort study of surveillance data, June to December 2020.


Journal

BMC public health
ISSN: 1471-2458
Titre abrégé: BMC Public Health
Pays: England
ID NLM: 100968562

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
14 10 2022
Historique:
received: 21 02 2022
accepted: 02 09 2022
revised: 24 08 2022
entrez: 14 10 2022
pubmed: 15 10 2022
medline: 19 10 2022
Statut: epublish

Résumé

From 12th March 2020, individuals in England were advised to quarantine in their home if a household member tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. A mandatory isolation period of 10 days was introduced on 28th September 2020 and applied to all individuals with COVID-19. We assessed the frequency, timing, and characteristics of recovered COVID-19 cases requiring subsequent quarantine episodes due to household re-exposure. In this case cohort study, all laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases notified in England (29th June to 28th December 2020) were analysed to identify consecutive household case(s). Multivariable logistic regression was used to determine associations between case characteristics and need to quarantine following recent infection (within 28 days of diagnosis). Among 1,651,550 cases resident in private dwellings and Houses of Multiple Occupancy (HMOs), 744,548 (45.1%) were the only case in their home and 56,179 (3.4%) were succeeded by further household cases diagnosed within 11-28 days of their diagnosis. Of 1,641,412 cases arising in private homes, the likelihood of further household cases was highest for Bangladeshi (aOR = 2.20, 95% CI = 2.10-2.31) and Pakistani (aOR = 2.15, 95% CI = 2.08-2.22) individuals compared to White British, as well as among young people (17-24y vs. 25-64y; aOR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.16-1.22), men (vs. women; aOR = 1.06, 95% CI = 1.04-1.08), London residents (vs. Yorkshire and Humber; aOR = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.52-1.63) and areas of high deprivation (IMD 1 vs. 10; aOR = 1.13, 95% CI = 1.09-1.19). Policies requiring quarantine on re-exposure differentially impact some of the most disadvantaged populations. Quarantine exemption for recently recovered individuals could mitigate the socioeconomic impact of responses to COVID-19 or similar infectious disease outbreaks.

Sections du résumé

BACKGROUND
From 12th March 2020, individuals in England were advised to quarantine in their home if a household member tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. A mandatory isolation period of 10 days was introduced on 28th September 2020 and applied to all individuals with COVID-19. We assessed the frequency, timing, and characteristics of recovered COVID-19 cases requiring subsequent quarantine episodes due to household re-exposure.
METHODS
In this case cohort study, all laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases notified in England (29th June to 28th December 2020) were analysed to identify consecutive household case(s). Multivariable logistic regression was used to determine associations between case characteristics and need to quarantine following recent infection (within 28 days of diagnosis).
RESULTS
Among 1,651,550 cases resident in private dwellings and Houses of Multiple Occupancy (HMOs), 744,548 (45.1%) were the only case in their home and 56,179 (3.4%) were succeeded by further household cases diagnosed within 11-28 days of their diagnosis. Of 1,641,412 cases arising in private homes, the likelihood of further household cases was highest for Bangladeshi (aOR = 2.20, 95% CI = 2.10-2.31) and Pakistani (aOR = 2.15, 95% CI = 2.08-2.22) individuals compared to White British, as well as among young people (17-24y vs. 25-64y; aOR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.16-1.22), men (vs. women; aOR = 1.06, 95% CI = 1.04-1.08), London residents (vs. Yorkshire and Humber; aOR = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.52-1.63) and areas of high deprivation (IMD 1 vs. 10; aOR = 1.13, 95% CI = 1.09-1.19).
CONCLUSION
Policies requiring quarantine on re-exposure differentially impact some of the most disadvantaged populations. Quarantine exemption for recently recovered individuals could mitigate the socioeconomic impact of responses to COVID-19 or similar infectious disease outbreaks.

Identifiants

pubmed: 36241977
doi: 10.1186/s12889-022-14254-x
pii: 10.1186/s12889-022-14254-x
pmc: PMC9562076
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

1915

Informations de copyright

© 2022. Crown.

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Auteurs

Rachel Merrick (R)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK. Rachel.Merrick@ukhsa.gov.uk.

Dimple Chudasama (D)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Joe Flannagan (J)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Ines Campos-Matos (I)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Annabelle Howard (A)

COVID-19 International Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Renu Bindra (R)

COVID-19 National Guidance Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

O Noël Gill (ON)

COVID-19 National Guidance Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Gavin Dabrera (G)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

Theresa Lamagni (T)

COVID-19 National Epidemiology Cell, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK.

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