Cancelling cancellation? Sensorimotor control, agency, and prediction.

For decades, classic theories of action control and action awareness have been built around the idea that the brain predictively 'cancels' expected action outcomes from perception. However, recent research casts doubt over this basic premise. What do these new findings mean for classic accounts of action? Should we now 'cancel' old data, theories and approaches generated under this idea? In this paper, we argue 'No'. While doubts about predictive cancellation may urge us to fundamentally rethink how predictions shape perception, the wider pyramid using these ideas to explain action control and agentic experiences can remain largely intact. Some adaptive functions assigned to predictive cancellation can be achieved through quasi-predictive processes, that influence perception without actively tracking the probabilistic structure of the environment. Other functions may rely upon truly predictive processes, but not require that these predictions cancel perception. Appreciating the role of these processes may help us to move forward in explaining how agents optimise their interactions with the external world, even if predictive cancellation is cancelled from theory.

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