It's the Wrong Virus: Rapid Adaptation of Operations Inside a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Select Agent Laboratory in Response to the 2019 SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic.
IBC
SARS-CoV-2
biorisk management
hamster
inactivation
influenza
Journal
Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association
ISSN: 2470-1246
Titre abrégé: Appl Biosaf
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101122979
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
01 Jun 2022
01 Jun 2022
Historique:
entrez:
13
2
2023
pubmed:
14
2
2023
medline:
14
2
2023
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
The Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation. In this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling. The demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.
Sections du résumé
Background
UNASSIGNED
The Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation.
Results
UNASSIGNED
In this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling.
Summary
UNASSIGNED
The demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.
Identifiants
pubmed: 36776748
doi: 10.1089/apb.2021.0030
pii: 10.1089/apb.2021.0030
pmc: PMC9908283
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Pagination
58-63Informations de copyright
Copyright 2022, ABSA International 2022.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
No competing financial interests exist.
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