Stock price crash risk and military connected board: Evidence from Thailand.
Journal
PloS one
ISSN: 1932-6203
Titre abrégé: PLoS One
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101285081
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2023
2023
Historique:
received:
15
08
2022
accepted:
26
01
2023
medline:
5
6
2023
pubmed:
1
6
2023
entrez:
1
6
2023
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Based on the agency and stakeholder theories, effective boards, acting as an internal governance mechanism, reduce agency costs. This paper asks whether military connected boards represent a good governance tool by exploring how military connected boards affect stock price crash risk. Using instrumental variable analysis, we document that firms with military connected boards have lower risk of stock price crashes. Our findings are unlikely to have endogeneity concerns and shed light on the role of military connected boards as an effective internal governance tool. Consistent with the conservatism hypothesis and stakeholder theory, by being transparent about firm-specific bad news, military connected boards could effectively monitor managers to ensure they act on all stakeholders' interests.
Identifiants
pubmed: 37262037
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0281712
pii: PONE-D-22-22723
pmc: PMC10234529
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e0281712Informations de copyright
Copyright: © 2023 Treepongkaruna et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
No
Références
J Pers. 1989 Jun;57(2):311-41
pubmed: 2769559