Government regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory.
Journal
PloS one
ISSN: 1932-6203
Titre abrégé: PLoS One
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101285081
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2023
2023
Historique:
received:
11
01
2023
accepted:
22
05
2023
medline:
12
6
2023
pubmed:
8
6
2023
entrez:
8
6
2023
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
In the innovation ecosystem, the knowledge-based game behavior of each subject not only pertains to its own survival and development but also affects evolution of the innovation ecosystem. The present study investigates the choice of government's regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation protection strategy and following firms' imitation strategy from the perspective of group evolutionary game. Based on the cost-benefit perspective, an asymmetric tripartite evolutionary game model and a simulation model are constructed to analyze the strategies and stability of the evolutionary equilibrium of each subject. We focus mainly on the protection intensity of innovation achievements by leading enterprises and the difficulty of imitation and substitution by following enterprises. The cost of patent operation and maintenance, government subsidies, and the relative difficulty of technology substitution and imitation were identified as the key factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium of the system. Based on different scenarios resulting from the aforementioned factors, four equilibrium states are observed in the system, namely {no government regulation, technology secrecy, substitution}, {no government regulation, technology secrecy, imitation}, {no government regulation, patent application, imitation}, and {government regulation, patent application, imitation}. Finally, the study suggests corresponding recommendations for the three parties, which can help governments as well as the leading and following firms to choose appropriate behavioral strategies. At the same time, this study offers positive insights to participants in the global innovation ecosystem.
Identifiants
pubmed: 37289768
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0286730
pii: PONE-D-23-00893
pmc: PMC10249874
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e0286730Informations de copyright
Copyright: © 2023 Zhang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
The authors declare that there are no competing interests.
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