Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?
Compatibilism
Conscious intention
Decision-making
Determinism
Free choice
Free will
Libertarian
Mental causation
Physicalism
Journal
Neuropsychologia
ISSN: 1873-3514
Titre abrégé: Neuropsychologia
Pays: England
ID NLM: 0020713
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
09 09 2023
09 09 2023
Historique:
received:
15
02
2023
revised:
24
06
2023
accepted:
26
06
2023
medline:
31
8
2023
pubmed:
30
6
2023
entrez:
29
6
2023
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.
Identifiants
pubmed: 37385373
pii: S0028-3932(23)00166-5
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Review
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
108632Informations de copyright
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