Beneficence cannot justify voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.

The patient's autonomy and well-being are sometimes seen as central to the ethical justification of voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). While respecting the patient's wish to die plausibly promotes the patient's autonomy, it is less obvious how alleviating the patient's suffering through death benefits the patient. Death eliminates the subject, so how can we intelligibly maintain that the patient's well-being is promoted when she/he no longer exists? This article interrogates two typical answers given by philosophers: (a) that death confers a well-being benefit in the sense that it actualises a comparatively better life course for the patient (ie, a shorter life with less net suffering), and (b) that death is beneficial because non-existence which entails no suffering is superior to an existence filled with suffering. A close examination of the two senses in which the patient might incur a well-being benefit reveals problems that preclude physicians delivering VE/PAS in the name of beneficence.

Informations de copyright

© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

Competing interests: None declared.