Beyond the simplicity of theory of mind deficit in multiple sclerosis: from kinetic perception to socio-emotional abstraction and mentalizing.
Assessment
Cognitive functions
Disability
Multiple sclerosis
Social cognition
Theory of mind
Journal
Multiple sclerosis and related disorders
ISSN: 2211-0356
Titre abrégé: Mult Scler Relat Disord
Pays: Netherlands
ID NLM: 101580247
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
Sep 2023
Sep 2023
Historique:
received:
19
05
2023
revised:
06
07
2023
accepted:
13
07
2023
medline:
11
9
2023
pubmed:
26
7
2023
entrez:
25
7
2023
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Theory of Mind (ToM) processing in Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is still poorly understood due to the difficulty of most tasks in qualifying the mentalizing deficit net of cognitive load. In this study, we administered the New False Belief Animation Task (NFBAT) to 50 MS and 33 healthy controls (HC) to investigate spontaneous mentalizing in ToM and goal-directed interactions. The global cognitive level was assessed by the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA). NFBAT appropriateness and intentionality scores were computed to investigate the ToM accuracy and intentionality attribution difficulties. NFBAT answers were qualitatively analyzed and categorized into kinetically and socially coherent/not coherent responses to test a low-level perceptual deficit. The main result showed dysfunctional mentalizing reasoning in MS compared to HC in the NFBAT Intentionality score in ToM conditions (p = 0.028, d = 0.501), while the two groups were equally proficient in mentalization accuracy. The Intentionality underperformance in MS was related to social low-level perceptual processing (β =0.06, p < 0.001) and visuospatial functions (β =0.05, p =0.002). A predictive role of memory and executive functions on NFBAT Intentionality scores was not observed. These results strengthen the hypothesis that ToM in MS is likely related to low-level social processing.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
Theory of Mind (ToM) processing in Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is still poorly understood due to the difficulty of most tasks in qualifying the mentalizing deficit net of cognitive load.
METHODS
METHODS
In this study, we administered the New False Belief Animation Task (NFBAT) to 50 MS and 33 healthy controls (HC) to investigate spontaneous mentalizing in ToM and goal-directed interactions. The global cognitive level was assessed by the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA). NFBAT appropriateness and intentionality scores were computed to investigate the ToM accuracy and intentionality attribution difficulties. NFBAT answers were qualitatively analyzed and categorized into kinetically and socially coherent/not coherent responses to test a low-level perceptual deficit.
RESULTS
RESULTS
The main result showed dysfunctional mentalizing reasoning in MS compared to HC in the NFBAT Intentionality score in ToM conditions (p = 0.028, d = 0.501), while the two groups were equally proficient in mentalization accuracy. The Intentionality underperformance in MS was related to social low-level perceptual processing (β =0.06, p < 0.001) and visuospatial functions (β =0.05, p =0.002). A predictive role of memory and executive functions on NFBAT Intentionality scores was not observed.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSIONS
These results strengthen the hypothesis that ToM in MS is likely related to low-level social processing.
Identifiants
pubmed: 37490809
pii: S2211-0348(23)00395-4
doi: 10.1016/j.msard.2023.104894
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
104894Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
Declaration of Competing Interest None.