Examining the relationship between metacognitive trust in thinking styles and supernatural beliefs.
Dual-processing
meta-cognition
paranormal belief
religious belief
thinking styles
trust
Journal
Scandinavian journal of psychology
ISSN: 1467-9450
Titre abrégé: Scand J Psychol
Pays: England
ID NLM: 0404510
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
Apr 2024
Apr 2024
Historique:
revised:
21
07
2023
received:
30
11
2022
accepted:
10
08
2023
medline:
18
3
2024
pubmed:
25
9
2023
entrez:
25
9
2023
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Conflicting findings have emerged from research on the relationship between thinking styles and supernatural beliefs. In two studies, we examined this relationship through meta-cognitive trust and developed a new: (1) experimental manipulation, a short scientific article describing the benefits of thinking styles: (2) trust in thinking styles measure, the Ambiguous Decisions task; and (3) supernatural belief measure, the Belief in Psychic Ability scale. In Study 1 (N = 415) we found differences in metacognitive trust in thinking styles between the analytical and intuitive condition, and overall greater trust in analytical thinking. We also found stronger correlations between thinking style measures (in particular intuitive thinking) and psychic ability and paranormal beliefs than with religious beliefs, but a mixed-effect linear regression showed little to no variation in how measures of thinking style related to types of supernatural beliefs. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 with participants from the United States, Canada, and Brazil (N = 802), and found similar results, with the Brazilian participants showing a reduced emphasis on analytical thinking. We conclude that our new design, task, and scale may be particularly useful for dual-processing research on supernatural belief.
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
206-222Subventions
Organisme : BIAL Foundation
ID : 380/14
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 57676
Informations de copyright
© 2023 The Authors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology published by Scandinavian Psychological Associations and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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