Evolution as a result of resource flow in ecosystems: Ecological dynamics can drive evolution.

To see how the flow of energy across ecosystems can derive evolution, I introduce a framework in which individuals interact with their peers and environment to accumulate resources, and use the resources to pay for their metabolic costs, grow and reproduce. I show that two conservation principles determine the system's equilibrium state: conservation of resources- a physical principle stating that in the equilibrium, resource production and consumption should balance, and payoff equality- an economic principle, stating that the payoffs of different types in equilibrium should equal. Besides the equilibrium state, the system shows non-equilibrium fluctuations derived by the exponential growth of the individuals in which the payoff equality principle does not hold. A simple gradient-ascend dynamical mean-field equation predicts the onset of non-equilibrium fluctuations. As an example, I study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games. In both mixed and structured populations, cooperation evolves naturally in resource-poor environments but not in resource-rich environments. Population viscosity facilitates cooperation in poor environments but can be detrimental to cooperation in rich environments. In addition, cooperators and defectors show different life-history strategies: Cooperators live shorter lives and reproduce more than defectors. Both population structure and, more significantly, population viscosity reduce lifespan and life history differences between cooperators and defectors.

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Copyright: © 2023 Mohammad Salahshour. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.