Regulatory enforcement of the marketing of fixed-dose combinations in India: a case study of systemic antibiotics.

Fixed-dose combination (FDC) India Regulation Systemic antibiotics

Journal

Journal of pharmaceutical policy and practice
ISSN: 2052-3211
Titre abrégé: J Pharm Policy Pract
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101627192

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
10 Nov 2023
Historique:
received: 12 07 2023
accepted: 21 10 2023
medline: 11 11 2023
pubmed: 11 11 2023
entrez: 11 11 2023
Statut: epublish

Résumé

In India, states have licensed the manufacture of large numbers of fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs without the required prior approval of the central regulator. This paper describes two major regulatory initiatives to address the problem, which began in 2007 and 2013, and examines whether they have been sufficient to remove centrally unapproved systemic antibiotic FDCs from the market. Information was extracted from documents published by the central regulator and the ministry of health, including the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM), and court judgments, and analysed alongside sales volume data for 2008-2020 using PharmaTrac market dataset. The regulatory initiatives permitted 68 formulations to be given de facto approvals ('No Objection Certificates') outside the statutory regime, banned 46 FDCs and restricted one FDC. Market data show that FDCs as a proportion of total antibiotic sales increased from 32.9 in 2008 to 37.3% in 2020. The total number of antibiotic FDC formulations on the market fell from 574 (2008) to 395 (2020). Formulations with a record of prior central approval increased from 86 (2008) to 94 (2020) and their share of the antibiotic FDC sales increased from 32.0 to 55.3%. In 2020, an additional 23 formulations had been permitted de facto approval, accounting for 10.6% of the antibiotic FDC sales. Even in 2020, most marketed formulations (70.4%, 278/395) were unapproved or banned, and comprised a 15.9% share of the antibiotic FDC sales. The share of NLEM-listed antibiotic FDC sales increased from 21.2 (2008) to 26.7% (2020). The initiatives had limited impact. Regulatory enforcement has been slow and weak, with many unapproved, and even banned, FDCs remaining on the market.

Sections du résumé

BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
In India, states have licensed the manufacture of large numbers of fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs without the required prior approval of the central regulator. This paper describes two major regulatory initiatives to address the problem, which began in 2007 and 2013, and examines whether they have been sufficient to remove centrally unapproved systemic antibiotic FDCs from the market.
METHODS METHODS
Information was extracted from documents published by the central regulator and the ministry of health, including the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM), and court judgments, and analysed alongside sales volume data for 2008-2020 using PharmaTrac market dataset.
RESULTS RESULTS
The regulatory initiatives permitted 68 formulations to be given de facto approvals ('No Objection Certificates') outside the statutory regime, banned 46 FDCs and restricted one FDC. Market data show that FDCs as a proportion of total antibiotic sales increased from 32.9 in 2008 to 37.3% in 2020. The total number of antibiotic FDC formulations on the market fell from 574 (2008) to 395 (2020). Formulations with a record of prior central approval increased from 86 (2008) to 94 (2020) and their share of the antibiotic FDC sales increased from 32.0 to 55.3%. In 2020, an additional 23 formulations had been permitted de facto approval, accounting for 10.6% of the antibiotic FDC sales. Even in 2020, most marketed formulations (70.4%, 278/395) were unapproved or banned, and comprised a 15.9% share of the antibiotic FDC sales. The share of NLEM-listed antibiotic FDC sales increased from 21.2 (2008) to 26.7% (2020).
CONCLUSION CONCLUSIONS
The initiatives had limited impact. Regulatory enforcement has been slow and weak, with many unapproved, and even banned, FDCs remaining on the market.

Identifiants

pubmed: 37950272
doi: 10.1186/s40545-023-00644-y
pii: 10.1186/s40545-023-00644-y
pmc: PMC10636890
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Pagination

139

Informations de copyright

© 2023. The Author(s).

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Auteurs

Petra Brhlikova (P)

Population Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK. pbrhlikova@gmail.com.

Aashna Mehta (A)

Public Health Foundation of India, Gurugram, India.

Patricia McGettigan (P)

William Harvey Research Institute, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.

Allyson M Pollock (AM)

Population Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK.

Peter Roderick (P)

Population Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK.

Habib Hasan Farooqui (HH)

College of Medicine, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.

Classifications MeSH