The Moralizing Effect: self-directed emotions and their impact on culpability attributions.

culpability guilt judgment morality responsibility self-directed emotion shame

Journal

Frontiers in integrative neuroscience
ISSN: 1662-5145
Titre abrégé: Front Integr Neurosci
Pays: Switzerland
ID NLM: 101477950

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
2023
Historique:
received: 31 05 2023
accepted: 30 10 2023
medline: 14 12 2023
pubmed: 14 12 2023
entrez: 14 12 2023
Statut: epublish

Résumé

A general trend in the psychological literature suggests that guilt contributes to morality more than shame does. Unlike shame-prone individuals, guilt-prone individuals internalize the causality of negative events, attribute responsibility in the first person, and engage in responsible behavior. However, it is not known how guilt- and shame-proneness interact with the attribution of responsibility to others. In two Web-based experiments, participants reported their attributions of moral culpability (i.e., responsibility, causality, punishment and decision-making) about morally ambiguous acts of killing in different conditions. In Study 1 the vignettes were presented in the 1st person, while in Study 2 in the 3rd person. To test proneness to guilt and shame, we utilized the GASP scale, which differentiates between the affective and behavioral components of each emotion. Statistical analyses were performed in Matlab and R. We found that guilt- and shame-proneness were associated with the severity of attributions in both the first and the third person, but the effect was strong only in the guilt case (both subtypes) and shame-affect case, and not in the shame-behavior case. We call this the Moralizing Effect. We wonder whether our finding that guilt-prone people tend to attribute a higher degree of culpability to others is really consistent with the view that guilt motivates people to choose the "moral paths in life". This echoes views about the harmful aspects of guilt, which have been expressed historically in philosophy, for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38093826
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2023.1232523
pmc: PMC10717113
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Pagination

1232523

Informations de copyright

Copyright © 2023 Sirgiovanni, Smolenski, Abelson and Webb.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

The authors declare that this research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Auteurs

Elisabetta Sirgiovanni (E)

Section of History of Medicine, Department of Molecular Medicine, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy.

Joanna Smolenski (J)

Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX, United States.

Ben Abelson (B)

School of Liberal Arts, Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY, United States.

Taylor Webb (T)

Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States.

Classifications MeSH