Sense of agency in joint action: a critical review of we-agency.
collective identity
human-machine interaction
intentional binding
joint action
responsibility
sense of agency
Journal
Frontiers in psychology
ISSN: 1664-1078
Titre abrégé: Front Psychol
Pays: Switzerland
ID NLM: 101550902
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2024
2024
Historique:
received:
31
10
2023
accepted:
16
01
2024
medline:
15
2
2024
pubmed:
15
2
2024
entrez:
15
2
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action.
Identifiants
pubmed: 38356772
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1331084
pmc: PMC10864478
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Pagination
1331084Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2024 Le Besnerais, Moore, Berberian and Grynszpan.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. The author(s) declared that they were an editorial board member of Frontiers, at the time of submission. This had no impact on the peer review process and the final decision.