What's Wrong with Restrictivism?
abortion
ethics
inconsistency argument
organ donation
restrictivism
Journal
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
ISSN: 1469-2147
Titre abrégé: Camb Q Healthc Ethics
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 9208482
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
06 Mar 2024
06 Mar 2024
Historique:
medline:
6
3
2024
pubmed:
6
3
2024
entrez:
6
3
2024
Statut:
aheadofprint
Résumé
Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I'm a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.
Identifiants
pubmed: 38444239
doi: 10.1017/S0963180124000033
pii: S0963180124000033
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM