What's Wrong with Restrictivism?

abortion ethics inconsistency argument organ donation restrictivism

Journal

Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees
ISSN: 1469-2147
Titre abrégé: Camb Q Healthc Ethics
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 9208482

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
06 Mar 2024
Historique:
medline: 6 3 2024
pubmed: 6 3 2024
entrez: 6 3 2024
Statut: aheadofprint

Résumé

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I'm a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38444239
doi: 10.1017/S0963180124000033
pii: S0963180124000033
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

1-4

Auteurs

William M Simkulet (WM)

Philosophy, Park University, Parkville, USA.

Classifications MeSH