Aphantasia and involuntary imagery.

Afterimages Aphantasia Dreams Involuntary Mental imagery Voluntary

Journal

Consciousness and cognition
ISSN: 1090-2376
Titre abrégé: Conscious Cogn
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 9303140

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
01 Apr 2024
Historique:
received: 25 09 2023
revised: 06 03 2024
accepted: 09 03 2024
medline: 3 4 2024
pubmed: 3 4 2024
entrez: 2 4 2024
Statut: aheadofprint

Résumé

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38564857
pii: S1053-8100(24)00046-1
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103679
pii:
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article Review

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Pagination

103679

Informations de copyright

Copyright © 2024. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Auteurs

Raquel Krempel (R)

Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science, State University of Campinas, R. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 251 - Cidade Universitária, Campinas, SP 13083-859, Brazil; Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA. Electronic address: raquelak@gmail.com.

Merlin Monzel (M)

Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany. Electronic address: merlin.monzel@uni-bonn-diff.de.

Classifications MeSH