Nonlinear social evolution and the emergence of collective action.
coalescent theory
collective action
evolutionary dynamics
evolutionary game theory
social evolution
Journal
PNAS nexus
ISSN: 2752-6542
Titre abrégé: PNAS Nexus
Pays: England
ID NLM: 9918367777906676
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
Apr 2024
Apr 2024
Historique:
received:
13
03
2024
accepted:
21
03
2024
medline:
10
4
2024
pubmed:
10
4
2024
entrez:
10
4
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Organisms from microbes to humans engage in a variety of social behaviors, which affect fitness in complex, often nonlinear ways. The question of how these behaviors evolve has consequences ranging from antibiotic resistance to human origins. However, evolution with nonlinear social interactions is challenging to model mathematically, especially in combination with spatial, group, and/or kin assortment. We derive a mathematical condition for natural selection with synergistic interactions among any number of individuals. This result applies to populations with arbitrary (but fixed) spatial or network structure, group subdivision, and/or mating patterns. In this condition, nonlinear fitness effects are ascribed to collectives, and weighted by a new measure of collective relatedness. For weak selection, this condition can be systematically evaluated by computing branch lengths of ancestral trees. We apply this condition to pairwise games between diploid relatives, and to dilemmas of collective help or harm among siblings and on spatial networks. Our work provides a rigorous basis for extending the notion of "actor", in the study of social evolution, from individuals to collectives.
Identifiants
pubmed: 38595801
doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae131
pii: pgae131
pmc: PMC11002786
doi:
Banques de données
Dryad
['10.5061/dryad.c0r18']
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Pagination
pgae131Informations de copyright
© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences.