Rational reasons for irrational beliefs.


Journal

The American psychologist
ISSN: 1935-990X
Titre abrégé: Am Psychol
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 0370521

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
15 Apr 2024
Historique:
medline: 15 4 2024
pubmed: 15 4 2024
entrez: 15 4 2024
Statut: aheadofprint

Résumé

According to many, we live in "posttruth" times, with the pervasiveness of falsehoods being an existential threat to democracy and the functioning of free societies. Why do people believe and propagate falsehoods? Current accounts focus on psychological deficiencies, heuristic errors, self-enhancing motivations, and motivations to sow chaos. Here, we advance a complementary, outwardly (vs. inwardly) oriented, and ultimate (vs. proximate) account that people often believe and spread falsehoods for socially functional reasons. Under this view, falsehoods can serve as rare and valued information with which to rise in prestige, as signals of group commitment and loyalty tests, as ammunition with which to derogate rivals, or as outrages with which to mobilize the group toward shared goals. Thus, although people often generate and defend falsehoods through processes that are epistemically irrational, doing so might be rational from the perspective of the functions falsehoods serve. We discuss the implications of this view for puzzling theoretical phenomena and changing problematic beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Identifiants

pubmed: 38619485
pii: 2024-73290-001
doi: 10.1037/amp0001321
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Subventions

Organisme : Arizona State University Foundation for a New American University

Auteurs

Michael Barlev (M)

Department of Psychology, Arizona State University.

Steven L Neuberg (SL)

Department of Psychology, Arizona State University.

Classifications MeSH