A Survey on Satellite Communication System Security.

satellite communication system security attack methodologies security countermeasure space policy and strategy

Journal

Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)
ISSN: 1424-8220
Titre abrégé: Sensors (Basel)
Pays: Switzerland
ID NLM: 101204366

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
01 May 2024
Historique:
received: 10 04 2024
revised: 28 04 2024
accepted: 30 04 2024
medline: 11 5 2024
pubmed: 11 5 2024
entrez: 11 5 2024
Statut: epublish

Résumé

In recent years, satellite communication systems (SCSs) have rapidly developed in terms of their role and capabilities, promoted by advancements in space launch technologies. However, this rapid development has also led to the emergence of significant security vulnerabilities, demonstrated through real-world targeted attacks such as AcidRain and AcidPour that demand immediate attention from the security community. In response, various countermeasures, encompassing both technological and policy-based approaches, have been proposed to mitigate these threats. However, the multitude and diversity of these proposals make their comparison complex, requiring a systemized view of the landscape. In this paper, we systematically categorize and analyze both attacks and defenses within the framework of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, focusing on specific threats that pose substantial risks to SCSs. Furthermore, we evaluate existing countermeasures against potential threats in SCS environments and offer insights into the security policies of different nations, recognizing the strategic importance of satellite communications as a national asset. Finally, we present prospective security challenges and solutions for future SCSs, including full quantum communication, AI-integrated SCSs, and standardized protocols for the next generation of terrestrial-space communication.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38733004
pii: s24092897
doi: 10.3390/s24092897
pii:
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article Review

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Subventions

Organisme : Defense Acquisition Program Administration
ID : KRIT-CT-22-021

Auteurs

Minjae Kang (M)

Major in Bio-Artificial Intelligence, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Hanyang University, Ansan 15588, Republic of Korea.

Sungbin Park (S)

Major in Bio-Artificial Intelligence, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Hanyang University, Ansan 15588, Republic of Korea.

Yeonjoon Lee (Y)

College of Computing, Hanyang University, Ansan 15588, Republic of Korea.

Classifications MeSH