Federal Trade Commission Actions on Prescription Drugs, 2000-2022.


Journal

JAMA
ISSN: 1538-3598
Titre abrégé: JAMA
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 7501160

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
20 May 2024
Historique:
medline: 20 5 2024
pubmed: 20 5 2024
entrez: 20 5 2024
Statut: aheadofprint

Résumé

The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) oversight role in the pharmaceutical market is critical to the health of patients and the health care system. This study characterized the FTC's policy on the pharmaceutical market in recent decades, identifying the types of actions it has favored, barriers it has faced, and authorities that remain untested. To review FTC legal actions in the pharmaceutical market from 2000-2022. Legal actions were determined through manual review of search results from the FTC's online Legal Library as well as a 2023 FTC report on pharmaceutical actions. The alleged misconduct, type of legal action taken, timing, and outcome were collected from press releases, complaints, orders, and other legal documents. From 2000-2022, the FTC challenged 62 mergers, brought 22 enforcement actions against allegedly unlawful business practices, and made 1 rule related to pharmaceuticals. Alleged misconduct in enforcement actions involved anticompetitive settlements in patent litigation (n = 11), unilateral actions by brand manufacturers to delay generic competition (n = 6), noncompete agreements (n = 4), and monopolization (n = 3), with 10 outcomes involving monetary payment, totaling $1.6 billion. Of the 62 mergers the FTC challenged, 61 were allowed to continue, 58 after divesting certain drugs to third-party competitors. The FTC's reliance on drug divestitures decreased from 18 drugs per year from 2000-2017 to 4.3 per year from 2017-2023. The FTC brought about 1 enforcement action and 3 merger actions per year against pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2000-2022, pursuing a small fraction of the estimated misconduct and consolidation in the pharmaceutical marketplace. Although the FTC faces substantial legal and practical limitations, important tools remain untested, including a rule defining "unfair methods of competition," that may allow it to more effectively prevent repetitive patterns of anticompetitive behavior.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38767878
pii: 2818971
doi: 10.1001/jama.2024.5737
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Sous-ensembles de citation

IM

Auteurs

C Joseph Ross Daval (CJR)

Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.

Alexander C Egilman (AC)

Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.

Ameet Sarpatwari (A)

Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.

Aaron S Kesselheim (AS)

Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.

Classifications MeSH