Legislative Intent and Agency: A Rational Unity Account.

group agency intentionalism legal interpretation legislative intent

Journal

Oxford journal of legal studies
ISSN: 0143-6503
Titre abrégé: Oxf J Leg Stud
Pays: England
ID NLM: 100973094

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
2024
Historique:
medline: 10 6 2024
pubmed: 10 6 2024
entrez: 10 6 2024
Statut: epublish

Résumé

Realist theories of legislative intent can be divided between aggregative theories (on which legislative intent is what some proportion of legislators intend) and common intent theories (on which legislative intent is a unanimous intent among legislators). In this article, we advance and defend an alternative realist conception of legislative intent: the rational unity account. On this account, the legislature is an agent with a distinctive 'rational point of view'-a concept we adopt from social ontology. The legislature's rational point of view is shaped by its procedures and structures, in ways not determined by either a common intention held by legislators or an aggregation of the intentions of legislators. We explain how our view improves on existing accounts. We then apply it to three cases to demonstrate its implications for legal interpretation. Importantly, on the proposed account, legislative intent can depart from what individual legislators think or know.

Identifiants

pubmed: 38855117
doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqae001
pii: gqae001
pmc: PMC11157289
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Pagination

231-256

Informations de copyright

© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press.

Auteurs

Stephanie Collins (S)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Monash University.

Classifications MeSH