Assessing the instantaneous social dilemma on social distancing attitudes and vaccine behavior in disease control.
Pairwise game
Social dilemma
Social distancing
Vaccination game
Journal
Scientific reports
ISSN: 2045-2322
Titre abrégé: Sci Rep
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101563288
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
20 06 2024
20 06 2024
Historique:
received:
13
01
2024
accepted:
05
06
2024
medline:
21
6
2024
pubmed:
21
6
2024
entrez:
20
6
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
In the face of infectious disease outbreaks, the collective behavior of a society can has a profound impact on the course of the epidemic. This study investigates the instantaneous social dilemma presented by individuals' attitudes toward vaccine behavior and its influence on social distancing as a critical component in disease control strategies. The research employs a multifaceted approach, combining modeling techniques and simulation to comprehensively assess the dynamics between social distancing attitudes and vaccine uptake during disease outbreaks. With respect to modeling, we introduce a new vaccination game (VG) where, unlike conventional VG models, a 2-player and 2-strategy payoff structure is aptly embedded in the individual behavior dynamics. Individuals' willingness to adhere to social distancing measures, such as mask-wearing and physical distancing, is strongly associated with their inclination to receive vaccines. The study reveals that a positive attitude towards social distancing tends to align with a higher likelihood of vaccine acceptance, ultimately contributing to more effective disease control. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, swift and coordinated public health measures are essential to curbing the spread of infectious diseases. This study underscores the urgency of addressing the instantaneous social dilemma posed by individuals' attitudes. By understanding the intricate relationship between these factors, policymakers, and healthcare professionals can develop tailored strategies to promote both social distancing compliance and vaccine acceptance, thereby enhancing our ability to control and mitigate the impact of disease outbreaks in the future.
Identifiants
pubmed: 38902279
doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-64143-z
pii: 10.1038/s41598-024-64143-z
doi:
Substances chimiques
COVID-19 Vaccines
0
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
14244Informations de copyright
© 2024. The Author(s).
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