The Effects of Physician Vertical Integration on Referral Patterns, Patient Welfare, and Market Dynamics.

I11 I18 L40 market concentration referral patterns vertical integration

Journal

Journal of public economics
ISSN: 0047-2727
Titre abrégé: J Public Econ
Pays: Netherlands
ID NLM: 101084660

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
Oct 2024
Historique:
pmc-release: 01 10 2025
medline: 5 8 2024
pubmed: 5 8 2024
entrez: 5 8 2024
Statut: ppublish

Résumé

The growth of physician vertical integration raises concerns about distorted referral patterns, higher spending, and market foreclosure. Using 100% Medicare data, we combine reduced-form analysis with a discrete choice model to estimate the effects of physician vertical integration on patients' provider choices and welfare for two common "downstream" surgical procedures. Physician-hospital integration results in an approximately 10% increase in referrals to higher-priced facilities instead of lower-priced providers. Our counterfactual analysis implies that if all primary care physicians become integrated, total Medicare spending will increase by $315 million.

Identifiants

pubmed: 39099735
doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105175
pmc: PMC11296566
pii:
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Auteurs

Christopher M Whaley (CM)

Brown University School of Public Health, Department of Health Services, Policy, and Practice.

Xiaoxi Zhao (X)

Department of Economics, Boston University, and RAND Corporation.

Classifications MeSH