The Effects of Physician Vertical Integration on Referral Patterns, Patient Welfare, and Market Dynamics.
I11
I18
L40
market concentration
referral patterns
vertical integration
Journal
Journal of public economics
ISSN: 0047-2727
Titre abrégé: J Public Econ
Pays: Netherlands
ID NLM: 101084660
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
Oct 2024
Oct 2024
Historique:
pmc-release:
01
10
2025
medline:
5
8
2024
pubmed:
5
8
2024
entrez:
5
8
2024
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
The growth of physician vertical integration raises concerns about distorted referral patterns, higher spending, and market foreclosure. Using 100% Medicare data, we combine reduced-form analysis with a discrete choice model to estimate the effects of physician vertical integration on patients' provider choices and welfare for two common "downstream" surgical procedures. Physician-hospital integration results in an approximately 10% increase in referrals to higher-priced facilities instead of lower-priced providers. Our counterfactual analysis implies that if all primary care physicians become integrated, total Medicare spending will increase by $315 million.
Identifiants
pubmed: 39099735
doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105175
pmc: PMC11296566
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng