Analysis of public records of lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drink industries in Chile: a qualitative study.

Chile Commercial determinants of health Health policy Lobbying Sugar

Journal

Lancet regional health. Americas
ISSN: 2667-193X
Titre abrégé: Lancet Reg Health Am
Pays: England
ID NLM: 9918232503006676

Informations de publication

Date de publication:
Jul 2024
Historique:
received: 16 01 2024
revised: 03 05 2024
accepted: 15 05 2024
medline: 5 8 2024
pubmed: 5 8 2024
entrez: 5 8 2024
Statut: epublish

Résumé

Given the role of commercial determinants on sugar consumption and health, this study aimed to describe lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries in Chile between 2014 and 2022. Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies. From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as 'bad solutions'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations. Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required. Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.

Sections du résumé

Background UNASSIGNED
Given the role of commercial determinants on sugar consumption and health, this study aimed to describe lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries in Chile between 2014 and 2022.
Methods UNASSIGNED
Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies.
Findings UNASSIGNED
From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as 'bad solutions'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations.
Interpretation UNASSIGNED
Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required.
Funding UNASSIGNED
Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.

Identifiants

pubmed: 39100991
doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100794
pii: S2667-193X(24)00121-2
pmc: PMC11294830
doi:

Types de publication

Journal Article

Langues

eng

Pagination

100794

Informations de copyright

© 2024 The Author(s).

Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts

All authors declare no competing interests. This study will be part of a PhD thesis. YA's PhD studies are funded by ANID (Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo—Chile)—Scholarship ID 72210219 while funding to cover article publication fees is provided by UCL. None of those institutions had any influence over the research undertaken. GT declares annual honoraria unrelated to this research as an associate editor of the Community Dentistry and Oral Epidemiology Journal and Chair of the Platform for Better Oral Health in Europe (2019–2023).

Auteurs

Yanela Aravena-Rivas (Y)

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.

Anja Heilmann (A)

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.

Richard G Watt (RG)

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.

Tom Broomhead (T)

Unit of Oral Health, Dentistry and Society, School of Clinical Dentistry, University of Sheffield, 19 Claremont Crescent, Sheffield, S10 2TA, UK.

Georgios Tsakos (G)

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.

Classifications MeSH