Cognitive Capacities as Functional Natural Kinds.
Cognitive explanation
Cognitive variation
Individuation of cognitive capacities
Interventionist causation
Mechanisms
Multiple realization
Neurocognitive integration
Journal
Integrative psychological & behavioral science
ISSN: 1936-3567
Titre abrégé: Integr Psychol Behav Sci
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101319534
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
26 Aug 2024
26 Aug 2024
Historique:
accepted:
20
07
2024
medline:
26
8
2024
pubmed:
26
8
2024
entrez:
25
8
2024
Statut:
aheadofprint
Résumé
In this paper, we articulate a functional approach to cognitive capacities. It is a restricted functionalism for various reasons, but especially because it does not claim that all cognitive (and/or mental) entities and processes are functional in the sense of a systemic capacities approach. One of the central aims of a cognitive theory consists in providing explanations of behavioral phenomena of (human and non-human) animals, and of the phenomena that are involved in those explanations. We accept that part of what lies at the heart of these explanations are certain functional entities -we call them "cognitive functional systems" -which in our view stand for most of the cognitive capacities of an organism; that is, systems that are individuated primarily by the main cognitive functions they undertake. Additionally, in the paper, we go into further detail concerning these functional systems, their internal organization, the nature of their causal interactions, etc. We also argue that some of these classes of cognitive functional systems (i.e., cognitive capacities) can be construed as "natural kinds" whenever their kinds of functional organizations are understood as kinds of hierarchically ordered classes of information processing events that are related among each other in regular (often complex) ways.
Identifiants
pubmed: 39183256
doi: 10.1007/s12124-024-09863-7
pii: 10.1007/s12124-024-09863-7
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Informations de copyright
© 2024. The Author(s).
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