The impact of group membership on punishment versus partner rejection.
Journal
Scientific reports
ISSN: 2045-2322
Titre abrégé: Sci Rep
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101563288
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
27 Sep 2024
27 Sep 2024
Historique:
received:
01
03
2024
accepted:
01
08
2024
medline:
28
9
2024
pubmed:
28
9
2024
entrez:
27
9
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
People often display ingroup bias in punishment, punishing outgroup members more harshly than ingroup members. However, the impact of group membership may be less pronounced when people are choosing whether to stop interacting with someone (i.e., partner rejection). In two studies (N = 1667), we investigate the impact of group membership on both response types. Participants were assigned to groups based on a "minimal" groups paradigm (Study 1) or their self-reported political positions (Study 2) and played an incentivized economic game with other players. In this game, participants (Responders) responded to other players (Deciders). In the Punishment condition, participants could decrease the Decider's bonus pay. In the Partner Rejection condition, participants could reject future interactions with the Decider. Participants played once with an ingroup member and once with an outgroup member. To control for the effects of intent and outcome, scenarios also differed based on the Decider's Intent (selfish versus fair) and the Outcome (equal versus unequal distribution of resources). Participants punished outgroup members more than ingroup members, however group membership did not influence decisions to reject partners. These results highlight partner rejection as a boundary condition for the impact of group on responses to transgressions.
Identifiants
pubmed: 39333223
doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-69206-9
pii: 10.1038/s41598-024-69206-9
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
22238Subventions
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 62221
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 62221
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 62221
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 62221
Organisme : John Templeton Foundation
ID : 62221
Organisme : Boston College Trustees
ID : 61138
Organisme : Boston College Trustees
ID : 61138
Organisme : Boston College Trustees
ID : 61138
Organisme : Boston College Trustees
ID : 61138
Organisme : Boston College Trustees
ID : 61138
Informations de copyright
© 2024. The Author(s).
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